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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Hall1
(decided March 25, 2008)
Azim Hall was arrested under suspicion of selling narcotics.2
Following the arrest, Hall was "indicted for criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third and fifth degrees. 3 Prior to trial,
Hall filed a motion to suppress certain evidence obtained during a
strip search.4 The trial court granted Hall's motion to suppress the
evidence and dismissed the indictment. The decision was appealed
to the Appellate Division, First Department, which unanimously re-
versed and reinstated the indictment.6 In response, Hall appealed to
the New York Court of Appeals, asserting that the search was unrea-
sonable under the United States Constitution7 and the New York
Constitution. 8 The Court of Appeals determined that the search was
unreasonable and reversed, reinstating the order suppressing the evi-
dence and dismissing the indictment.9
1 People v. Hall (Hall II) 886 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 159
(2008).
2 Id. at 164.
3 Id.
4 id.
5 People v. Hall (Hall1), 829 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86-87 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2007).
6 Id. at 89.
7 U.S. CONST amend. IV, states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons.., against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... "
8 N.Y. CONST art. I, § 12 states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ......
9 Hall II, 886 N.E.2d at 178-79.
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On February 10, 2005, the police conducted a narcotics sting
operation in Manhattan.'0 From the roof of a building, Sergeant
Burnes of the New York City Police Department observed the front
of a bodega where a man named Meyers took money from two indi-
viduals and subsequently delivered it to the defendant. 1 Burnes
watched as two individuals accosted Meyers and after a brief conver-
sation, gave him money. 12 Hall then entered the bodega for approxi-
mately three minutes, and upon his return "handed something to
Meyers," who in turn handed "two small, white objects" to the indi-
viduals.' 3 Burnes testified that the objects appeared to be crack co-
caine.
14
Drawing on his twenty years of experience as a police officer,
Bumes suspected a drug deal had taken place and notified Officer
Spiegel of the transaction. 15 Subsequently, Hall and Meyers were ar-
rested and taken into custody.'6 Upon arrival at the police station,
Spiegel searched Hall's clothing, but did not find any drugs.' 7 He
then requested that Hall disrobe.' 8 Hall was ordered to bend over for
a visual body cavity search, and Burnes and Spiegel observed a string
or a portion of a plastic bag protruding from Hall's rectum. 19
Bumes believed the item to be part of a package of drugs









'9 Hall 11, 886 N.E.2d at 164.
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within Hall's body, and ordered him to remove it.20 Hall refused to
comply, so Spiegel restrained him while Burnes removed the object.
2'
Predictably, the item removed from Hall's rectum was a bag contain-
ing crack cocaine rocks.22 Apparently, this type of concealment is
not uncommon as there was testimony that" 'a good majority' of the
persons arrested for narcotic offenses within a four-block radius of
where [the] defendant made his sale were found to have drugs hidden
between their buttocks. 23
The trial court granted Hall's motion to suppress the evidence
and dismissed the indictment.24 This decision was appealed to the
appellate division which unanimously reversed and reinstated the in-
dictment.25 On further appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that
an intrusion into an arrestee's body requires a warrant absent exigent
circumstances.2 6 Because there were no exigent circumstances that
required the extraction of the bag without a warrant, the court deter-
mined that " 'interests in human dignity and privacy' " required the
police to obtain a warrant by showing " 'a clear indication that ...
[relevant] evidence will be found' inside the arrestee's body. 27 The
facts in this case did not satisfy the "exigent circumstances" excep-
tion to the warrant requirement, because there was no possibility that




23 Id. at 169.
24 Hall I, 829 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
25 Id. at 106.
26 Hall II, 886 N.E.2d at 165.
27 Id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966)).
2009] 1113
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tained.28
The court laid out four levels of searches that are progres-
sively more intrusive, and therefore, require a higher standard under
the Fourth Amendment before they may be administered. 29 The po-
lice are free to search an arrestee's outer body following an arrest,
and may require a strip search based only on reasonable suspicion
that the arrestee is concealing evidence underneath her clothing.3°
However, in order to commence with a visual cavity inspection, the
police must have "particular, individualized facts ... that justify sub-
jecting an arrestee to these procedures., 31 A visual body cavity in-
spection is limited only to what the police can observe, and does not
extend to the highest level of searching, whereas a manual body cav-
ity search actually entails inserting or probing the inside of a sus-
pect's body.32 The court determined that the police were justified in
this situation in performing a visual body cavity search, and that the
search was reasonable.33
In order to understand the Court of Appeals' reasoning, it is
necessary to examine federal court decisions regarding intrusive
searches into a person's body. In Schmerber v. California, the defen-
dant moved to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content, which
had been obtained through a blood test performed at a hospital.34 The
defendant was taken to the hospital following an accident in which he
28 Id. at 169.
29 Id. at 164-65 (citing Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 n.3 (1st Cir. 1985)).
30 Id. at 166; see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 233-35 (1973).
31 Hall I, 886 N.E.2d at 168.
32 Id.
31 Id. at 169.
34 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759.
1114 [Vol. 25
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was allegedly driving drunk.35 While there, the police ordered that a
blood sample be taken despite the absence of a warrant.36
The United States Supreme Court determined that under the
Fourth Amendment,37 the protection against unreasonable search and
seizure would normally be violated by the police intrusion into a per-
son's body to obtain evidence absent a search warrant.38 However, in
light of the exigent circumstances presented, including the fact that
the blood alcohol content of an individual will diminish over time,
the Court concluded that the test was constitutional.39
The Court set forth an additional requirement that in the event
that exigent circumstances require a warrantless intrusion into a sus-
pect's body, the search should be done in a reasonable manner.40 The
Court did not outline a bright line rule for what constitutes a reason-
able search, but noted that the drawing of the suspect's blood had
been in a controlled environment of a hospital and was performed
"according to accepted medical practices. ' However, in finding this
intrusion to be constitutional and reasonable, the Court was also
noted that under different circumstances, such as at a police station,
the search may be "unjustified.,
42
In Winston v. Lee,43 the Supreme Court addressed whether
3 Id. at 758.
36 Id.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states, in pertinent part: "The right of people ... against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ......
38 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
" Id. at 770-71.
40 Id. at 771-72.
41 Id. at 7 71.
42 Id. at 772.
4' 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
20091 1115
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surgically removing a bullet from a suspect's body constituted an il-
legal search. 4 In Winston, the defendant was shot by a storekeeper
during an attempted robbery and taken into custody by the police a
few blocks from the store.4 5 The trial court ordered that, despite the
suspect's refusal, the bullet should be surgically removed for eviden-
tiary purposes.46 The Supreme Court determined that the surgery
would violate the suspect's Fourth Amendment right against unrea-
sonable searches even if it was "likely to produce evidence of a
crime. 47
The Court's opinion focused on the definition of "reasonable"
within the Fourth Amendment.48 Particularly, the Court emphasized
that, at the bare minimum, probable cause was required before a
search could be instituted.49 However, because this case involved
such an extreme form of intrusion, the Court determined that an indi-
vidual's privacy and security interests should be weighed against the
interest society has in the procedure on a case-by-case approach. °
Then, the Court balanced various factors before concluding
that the surgical intrusion was unreasonable. First, the "extent to
which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individ-
ual., 51 Second, the "extent of intrusion upon the individual's digni-
44 Id. at 753.
41 Id. at 755-56.
46 Id. at 756-57.
47 Id. at 759.
48 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states, in pertinent part: "The right of people.. against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
49 Winston, 470 U.S. at 760.
50 Id.
"' Id. at 761.
1116 [Vol. 25
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tary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity., 52 Finally, the
Court considered the potential evidentiary value to the state in effec-
tuating such an intrusion.53 Ultimately, the Court considered that the
surgery posed a serious threat, and would severely intrude into the
suspect's privacy, and that the need for the evidence was minimal as
there was other evidence available to accomplish the same goal.54
Winston expands on a previous Supreme Court decision in
which a balancing test was formulated to determine reasonableness of
searches. In Bell v. Wolfish,55 the Court determined that a prison pol-
icy of allowing visual cavity searches of inmates following visitation
sessions was constitutional. 56 The Court noted that the prison had in-
stituted this policy as a means of maintaining security within the
prison.57 In addition, this case dealt with the right against unreason-
able searches of detainees who had been charged with a crime but not
yet tried.58
Despite this distinction between pre-trial detainees and those
who have merely been arrested on suspicion of a crime, the Court de-
termined that a policy of conducting visual cavity searches must be
"reasonably related to a legitimate goal.",59 However, if no legitimate
goal existed, then the Court would infer that the purpose of the policy
was to punish the inmates, in violation of the United States Constitu-
52 Id.
" Id. at 765.
54 Winston, 470 U.S. at 766.
5 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
56 Id. at 558.
17 Id. at 560.
58 Id. at 523.
'9 Id. at 539.
2009] 1117
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tion.60 The Court concluded that a "test of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application., 61 Ultimately, the Court set forth what became the rea-
sonableness test that many courts would use as a basis for determin-
ing the extent to which a search may be conducted with or without a
warrant.62
In Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry,63 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed its prior decision in Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police
Department,64  and found a Los Angeles Police Department
("LAPD") policy, requiring that all arrested felony suspects be sub-
jected to a visual body cavity search, to be unconstitutional.65 In
Fuller, the defendant was arrested after being accused by a jewelry
store owner of stealing a ring that she had been examining.66 Follow-
ing her arrest, she underwent a visual strip search which was part of
the LAPD's policy for felony arrests.67 The police did not find the
ring and the suspect was released without any charges being filed.68
The circuit court determined that in order for a search to be
constitutional under Bell, the police must have reasonable suspicion
that the suspect may have concealed something that would threaten
60 Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.
61 Id. at 559.
62 Id. ("Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it
is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.").
63 950 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1991).
64 901 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1989).
65 Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1445.
66 Id. at 1439.
67 Id. at 1440 (noting that the policy had been declared unconstitutional after the search
was made but before the present decision was delivered).
68 Id. The ring was never found.
1118 [Vol. 25
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the security of the institution.69 Accordingly, the court determined
that Schmerber was controlling in this situation.7 ° In addition, the
court expanded on this determination by finding that "Schmerber
governs all searches that invade the interior of the body-whether by
a needle ... or visual intrusion into a body cavity.",
7 1
An interesting twist on this scenario arose in United States v.
Oyekan,72 in which two Nigerian citizens were detained when enter-
ing the country.73 The Eighth Circuit upheld as constitutional "rectal
and pelvic examinations" following an x-ray which showed objects
inside the suspects' bodies. 74 Although the court did not draw a dis-
tinction between manual and visual body cavity searches, it did note
that "a body cavity search must be conducted consistently with the
Schmerber factors, even though such a search does not technically
require piercing the skin, because both the degree and kind of intru-
sion involved are of analogous proportions. 75 This observation was
made despite the fact that "a rectal examination . . .produced a
packet containing heroin," suggesting that the court does not distin-
guish between a visual body cavity search and the removal of contra-
band from a body cavity.76
In Richmond v. City of Brooklyn Center,77 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals elaborated on its opinion of body cavity searches.
69 Id. at 1448.
70 Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1449.
71 Id.
72 786 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1986).
73 Id. at 833.
14 Id. at 839.
71 Id. at 839, n.13.
76 Id. at 834.
17 490 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2007).
2009] 1119
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In Richmond, a suspect was arrested at a motel on suspicion of selling
narcotics.78 While searching the suspect within the motel room, the
arresting officers suspected that he was concealing narcotics within
his body.7 9 One officer then restrained the suspect, while the other
conducted a visual body cavity search.80 The officer noticed a "piece
of tissue protruding from [the suspect's] buttocks," and proceeded to
remove the item.81 It was disputed whether the officer actually pene-
trated the suspect's anus, but ultimately, the evidence was suppressed
as being "the fruit of an illegal search," and the case was dismissed.82
However, in Richmond, the defendants did not appeal whether
the strip search itself had been reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment, and therefore the court did not specifically address that ques-
tion.83 Rather, the court's opinion suggested that the search had been
performed in a reasonable manner, in that it was performed in a pri-
vate area, by officers of the same sex as the suspect, and in a hygienic
manner. 84 It is interesting to note that no distinction was made as to
whether the removal of the item had any bearing on whether the
search would be reasonable.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has also not expressly
ruled on the same situation, however, in Rodriques v. Furtado,85 the
court upheld the issuance of a warrant to manually inspect a suspect's
" Id. at 1005.
79 Id. (noting that the officers had found the suspect to be in possession of small amount of
marijuana, various drug paraphanalia and had "several previous felony narcotic arrests").
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Richmond, 490 F.3d at 1005.
83 Id. at 1007.
84 Id. at 1008.
85 950 F.2d 805 (1st Cir. 1991).
1120 [Vol. 25
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body cavity.86 In Rodriques, the suspect was detained on suspicion of
selling narcotics. 87 The police obtained a warrant prior to the arrest,
which specifically mentioned that there was a "strong possibility that
[the] appellant was hiding heroin in a prophylactic in her vagina.
88
Following her arrest, the suspect was taken to a hospital and a doctor
performed the search of her vagina, although no contraband was dis-
covered.89
The details of the inspection were disputed, including the du-
ration of the inspection and the conditions in which it was per-
formed.90 Nevertheless, the First Circuit held that a body cavity
search is reasonable if performed under the authorization of a war-
rant.9' The court specifically mentioned its "revulsion for body cav-
ity searches not supported by probable cause," and went on to distin-
guish between manual and visual cavity searches.92 However, the
court did not make a clear distinction as to when a visual body cavity
search becomes a manual body cavity search. Instead, the court
noted that this particular type of search was a "total intrusion of per-
sonal privacy," but necessary in the interest of "prevention and pun-
ishment of drug trafficking., 93 Rodriques affirms a basic principle;
searches must be conducted privately, and "in a medically approved
manner" while at the same time distinguishing between different lev-
86 Id. at 808.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 808, n. 1.
89 Id. at 808.
90 Rodriques, 950 F.2d at 808.
9 Id. at 811.92 id. at 8 10-11.
9' Id. at 811.
2009] 1121
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els of intrusion into the body.94
The Fifth Circuit had the opportunity to deal with this matter
more directly in United States v. Himmelwright.95 In Himme/wright,
a suspect was taken into custody at Miami International Airport, and
detained after customs officers noticed that she had the characteristics
of a drug smuggler, and changed her story as to her reason for enter-
96ing the country. The suspect was removed to a separate room and a
female officer ordered the suspect to remove her clothes. 97 The in-
spector proceeded to inspect the suspect's crotch area and noticed a
"tab protruding from [the suspect's] vagina., 98 The inspector ordered
that the suspect remove the object, and after some objection, she
complied; removing in total six condoms containing 105 grams of
cocaine. 99 At trial, the defendant moved to suppress this evidence as
having been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 0 The
motion was denied and the defendant appealed to the Fifth Circuit.'
01
The Fifth Circuit found that the officers had the proper basis
of "reasonable suspicion" for the search and that the search was rea-
sonable. 10 2 In addition, the court noted that this search was only an
"exterior search of the suspect's body," and that "[t]here was no
probing . . . of [the suspect's] orifices."' 1 3 Furthermore, the court
94 Id.
9' 551 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1977).
96 Id. at 992.
9' Id. at 993.
98 Id.
99 Id.
OO Himmelwright, 551 F.2d at 993.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 995.
103 Id. at 996.
1122 [Vol. 25
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opined that it may if no object had been noticed protruding from the
suspect, further searching would likely have been unconstitu-
tional."
' 1°4
The New York Court of Appeals' decision in People v. Hall is
derived from a long history of cases where the court had to interpret
what constitutes an unreasonable search. The court in Hall, based its
decision primarily on a precedent set in People v. More. °5 In More,
the police responded to an apartment building after receiving a tip
that cocaine was being prepared for sale in one of the apartments.1
0 6
After being admitted by another tenant, the police entered the apart-
ment and observed the defendant next to a table with cocaine on it.10 7
The police arrested the defendant and performed a strip search on
him while he was still within the residence. 10 8 As the strip search es-
calated into a visual body cavity search, the police discovered co-
caine concealed in the defendant's rectum.0 9
The defendant moved to suppress the drugs seized from his
rectum; the motion was denied by the county court, and affirmed by
the appellate division.1 0 On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that
there were no exigent circumstances that required the police to act
immediately."' The court found that "body cavity searches incident
to an arrest are at least as intrusive as blood test procedures," and as a
104 Id.
105 764 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 2002).




o More, 764 N.E.2d at 968.
I' Id. at 969.
2009] 1123
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result the search was unreasonable. 1 2 The court took particular note
of the fact that the search was conducted in the defendant's residence,
expressly reserving the question of whether such a search would be
constitutional if conducted within a police station instead of a resi-
dence.'
13
In People v. De Bour,114 the Court of Appeals established a
reasonableness standard for one of the most common types of police
searches, the stop and frisk.' 1 5 In De Bour, the defendant was appre-
hended by police officers who noticed that he crossed the street to
avoid walking directly past them.' 1 6 Since it was after midnight and
the area had "a high incident of narcotics crimes," the officers be-
came suspicious and stopped him to inquire into where he was go-
ing.' 17 The defendant indicated that he was going to his girlfriend's
house, at which time one of the officer's noticed a bulge in the defen-
dant's waistline. 18 The officer asked him to open his coat, and when
he did, the officer noticed a revolver, and subsequently arrested the
defendant." 9
After the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of
a weapon, he appealed, and the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment affirmed the conviction. 20 On appeal, the Court of Appeals re-
112 Id.
113 Id. at970n*.
114 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
"' Id. at 566.
116 Id. at 565.
117 Id. at 565-66.
"18 Id. at 565.
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iterated the standard of reasonableness for search and seizures 121 set
forth in People v. Cantor,122 which requires "weighing of the gov-
ernment's interest against the encroachment involved with respect to
an individual's right to privacy and personal security."' 123 The court
noted that a search may not be validated "by what it produces."
'1 24
The court concluded that "[t]he overriding requirement of reason-
ableness ... must prevail."'' 25 Ultimately, the court considered this
level of intrusion as being "extremely minimal" and found that the
officer's action was "consonant with the respect and privacy of the
individual and as such was reasonable."'
126
However, in People v. Spinelli,127 the Court of Appeals found
a warrantless search of the backyard of an arrestee unconstitu-
tional.1 28 In Spinelli, the defendant was arrested after the FBI ob-
served two stolen vehicles on his property. 129 However, the police
obtained a warrant to arrest the defendant for crimes unrelated to the
stolen trucks, and had no warrant to arrest or search for the stolen ve-
hicles. 130 Although the police argued that the trucks were "in plain
view,"'131 the court found that the officer's subsequent search of the
121 N.Y. CONST art. I, § 12 states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ..
122 324 N.E.2d 872 (N.Y. 1975).
123 De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 566.
124 Id. at 567.
125 Id. at 568.
126 Id. at 570.
127 315 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1974).
121 Id. at 795.
129 Id. at 793.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 794. The plain view exception provides that "[a] person who leaves an article in
plain view has no legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to that item." However, the
fact that the item is in plain view is not sufficient to justify a search: the item must have
2009] 1125
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rear of the house after making the arrest at the front door was unrea-
sonable. 
13 2
The court, almost apologetically, commended the police for
their work, but nevertheless indicated that "there was ample time for
the law enforcement officials to secure a warrant in order to make a
significant intrusion onto the defendant's premises." 133 Furthermore,
there were no exigent circumstances that required immediate action
by the police. 34 The court explained that merely because obtaining a
warrant may be a burden, it is never a justification for not one."'
135
The court concluded by commending the police for their excellent
work, but indicating that privacy and decency are more important to
society than allowing police to use unfettered discretion in effectuat-
ing searches. 1
36
The Court of Appeals detailed a system for determining rea-
sonableness in People v. Perel;137 the greater the extent of the intru-
sion into a person's privacy, the greater the level of justification that
will be necessary to conduct the search. 138 In Perel, the defendant
was arrested on charges of performing an illegal abortion. 139 At the
time of his arrest, the defendant was in possession of a note with the
name of the woman on whom he had performed the abortion. 40 The
"come into plain view inadvertently." Id.





137 315 N.E.2d 452 (N.Y. 1974).
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police noticed the name on the slip after it was taken from the defen-
dant to be placed in an evidence envelope.
1 41
The Court of Appeals applied intuitive logic that "if a greater
intrusion is justified, a lesser related intrusion is unobjectionable" and
concluded that because the "maximum intrusion" had already been
caused by the "arrest and detention pending arraignment," the search
of the defendant's personal effects was reasonable. 42 While this
suggests that once an arrest has been made, any search of the person
would be reasonable, the court added that searches should be con-
ducted with a warrant, "absent specified categorical exceptions.' 43
Furthermore, the court indicated that an arrest does not necessarily
import the right to conduct a "full-blown search of the person" and
that such a search should be reasonable based on "the administrative
and security requirements of detention."
1 44
Another case which illuminates the concept of reasonable
searches within New York is People v. Hanlon, 1 45 where the Court of
Appeals declared itself to be the arbiter between "law enforcement
and individual rights."'146 Moreover, the court emphasized its aver-
sion to over-empowering law enforcement by indicating its belief that
warrants prevent "the dangers of unbridled power." 147 Furthermore,
141 Id.
142 Perel, 315 N.E.2d 455-56.
143 Id. at 455.
'44 Id. at 456-57.
145 330N.E.2d 631 (N.Y. 1975)
146 Id. at 635.
141 Id. at 637. The facts of this case dealt with whether or not hearsay statements could be
used to obtain a warrant. The court's history of balancing the rights of individuals against
enabling law enforcement to perform its duties is consistently utilized even in other types of
search and seizure cases.
2009] 1127
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in People v. Evans,148 the Court of Appeals determined that a search
beyond the outer layer of clothing that would normally accompany an
arrest is unconstitutional unless the arrest occurs nearly simultane-
ously with the search. 149 In addition, the court stressed that to vali-
date a search merely because there was probable cause would be to
"pu[t] the cart before the horse," essentially establishing an order of
events to ensure the reasonableness of a search.'50
In comparing the federal court decisions regarding body
searches to those in New York, it is clear that New York provides
greater protection. Despite finding that a visual search was constitu-
tional, the Hall Court determined that in order to initiate a manual
body cavity search, there must either be a warrant to do so, or exigent
circumstances, such as a possibility that the evidence will be de-
stroyed or lost. 5' The majority opinion was only joined by one other
justice, two justices concurred in part, and three justices dissented.'52
The concurring opinion would require a warrant for any body cavity
search, absent exigent circumstances. 53 The dissenting opinion sug-
gests that Schmerber does not cause the removal of a visible object
from a body to upgrade a visual cavity search to a more intrusive
manual cavity search.
54
The dissenting opinion differs in its understanding of the
148 371 N.E.2d 528 (N.Y. 1977).
149 Id. at 53 1. The defendant was arrested nearly a month after the search took place.
150 Id. at 531.
' Hall I, 886 N.E.2d at 169.
152 Id. at 164 n.1. Chief Judge Kaye concurred with Judge Graffeo's opinion, Judge Ci-
parick concurred in result along with Judge Jones, Judge Smith dissented and voted to affirm
in a different opinion in which Judges Read and Pigott concurred.
153 Id. at 170 (Ciparick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114 Id. at 177 (Smith, J., dissenting in part).
1128 [Vol. 25
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facts. The dissenting justices agree that Schmerber requires a warrant
for an intrusive body cavity search, but distinguishes intrusion into
the body from the removal of an item from the body.155 The dissent
also points out the obvious result of the majority's ruling: that police
officers may now conduct a visual search of a body cavity without a
warrant, but upon finding any evidence, the search must be discon-
tinued until a warrant is obtained.1
56
Bearing in mind New York's history of distancing itself from
the United States Supreme Court157, the examination of the various
circuit court opinions interpreting related Supreme Court decisions on
issues similar to the one presented in Hall reveals that the circuit
courts are split along the same lines as the concurrence and dissent in
Hall. Interestingly, the majority opinion, which distinguished visual
body cavity searches, as not requiring warrants, from manual body
cavity searches, which did require a warrant, stands as a precedent
distinct from the circuit court decisions. 158 The circuit court opinions
have not based a warrant requirement on the distinction between
manual or visual body cavity searches.'59.
In Fuller, the court did not distinguish between visual and
manual body cavity searches. Instead, the court indicated that
151 Id. at 178 (Smith, J., dissenting in part).
156 Hall, 10 N.E.2d at 178 (Smith, J., dissenting in part).
157 See Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The
New York State Court of Appeals' Quest for Principled Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK L. REV.
1,281-91 (1996).
158 See supra text accompanying notes 62-104.
159 See supra text accompanying notes 62-104. See generally William J. Simonitsch, Vis-
ual Body Cavity Searches Incident to Arrest: Validity Under the Fourth Amendment, 54 U.
MIAMI. L. REv. 665 (2000) (discussing the differences between visual and manual body cav-
ity searches as applied by state and federal courts).
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Schmerber governed visual searches and searches within the body.1 61
This opinion is similar to the concurrence in Hall, which would have
required a search warrant for either visual or manual body cavity
searches, absent exigent circumstances.
1 6 1
Similarly, the First Circuit in Rodriques did not lay out a
bright line rule for when a search becomes unreasonable. However,
the court was adamant in its disapproval of body cavity searches and
suggested that a warrant would ensure reasonableness. 162 This opin-
ion is most closely aligned with the concurrence in Hall which would
require a search warrant for both a visual and manual body cavity in-
spection. 63 That is not to say, however, that the First Circuit would
necessarily agree with the concurrence, as it does not specifically
state a bright line rule for when a search must be conducted with a
warrant.
The court in Himmelwright distinguished between the re-
moval of an item protruding from a body cavity, to actually penetrat-
ing a body cavity in search of contraband. 64 This clearly indicates
that the court does not equate a visual body cavity search with a
manual body cavity search. Accordingly, this decision correlates to
the dissenting opinion in Hall, which refused to liken the removal of
a visible object to a manual body cavity search. 65 However, the deci-
sion stands in contrast to the concurrence in that there was no warrant
160 Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1449; see supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
161 Hall II, 886 N.E.2d at 170 (Ciparick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
162 Rodriques, 950 F.2d at 811, see supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
163 Hall II, 886 N.E.2d at 170 (Ciparick, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164 Himmelwright, 551 F.2d at 996.
165 Hall I, 886 N.E.2d at 178 (Smith, J., dissenting in part).
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in this case, and yet the search was found to be reasonable. 166
Finally, the court in Richmond stressed reasonableness as the
touchstone of a body cavity search, but did not emphasize the differ-
ence between visual and manual cavity searches. This opinion found
the search to be unreasonable based on the location and manner in
which it was conducted. 167 Accordingly, this opinion is more in line
with the dissent in Hall in that the search in Hall was conducted pri-
vately, in a police station and with minimal use of force.
It should be noted that on June 13, 2008 a writ for certiorari
was submitted to the United States Supreme Court to appeal the deci-
sion in Hall.168 The petition makes specific note of the issues this re-
cent case addresses, among other concerns. Specifically, the petition
notes that "in the forty-two years since Schmerber, courts nationwide
have struggled to interpret what constitutes an intrusion into the body
requiring a warrant."' 169 On October 6, 2008, the Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari, ending the possibility that much needed clarification
would be provided.
7 0
This issue has generated a great deal of a controversy and un-
certainty, especially within police departments regarding the limits of
what can and cannot be done.' 7' Aside from the difficulty in imple-
menting standards that will withstand constitutional scrutiny, indi-
viduals could not possibly know at what point their rights are being
166 Himmelwright, 551 F.2d at 996.
167 Richmond, 490 F.3d at 1008.
168 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, New York v. Hall, 2008 WL 2445477 (No. 07-1568).
169 Id. at *38.
170 New York v. Hall, 129 S. Ct. 159 (2008).
171 Simonitsch, supra note 159, at 681-88 (citing examples of states who have codified a
warrant requirement to ensure law enforcement officials conduct reasonable searches).
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violated during a post-arrest search. The time is ripe for the Supreme
Court to step in and clarify exactly what is meant by an intrusion, and
lay out in clear terms exactly what the United States Constitution
says about the right to privacy in regard to the most private parts of a
person's body.
I think that the Supreme Court will someday decide this issue
as it becomes more pronounced. When that time comes, the Court
will likely apply a balancing test that will clarify the difference be-
tween a visual and a manual body cavity search. In the end, the rea-
soning of the concurrence in People v. Hall is likely to hold the most
weight. Only by requiring that a neutral party authorize a search of
the most private areas of a person's body, can it be assured that a per-
son's rights are not violated.
Ultimately, I do not think the Supreme Court will resort to
making unclear distinctions between visual searching and removing
of an object that is observed. Rather, the Court will lay down a rule
that clearly defines the circumstances in which police may conduct
searches without a warrant, and at what point it will be clear that a
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CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
United States Constitution Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...
be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
New York Constitution article I, section 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall . . . be
confronted with the witnesses against him or her.
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